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Abstract
This paper studies the role of producer entry for global monetary policy and the propa-
gation of the international business cycle in a two-country general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with monopoly distortions and imperfect price adjustment. It introduces endogenous entry into
the model of Benigno and Benigno (2008) so as to provide a ￿rst step towards the joint deter-
mination of exchange rates and product varieties under interest rate rules. The paper shows
that endogenous product variety has relevant consequences for the dynamics of the exchange
rate and the terms of trade, highlighting a novel channel of international cyclical transmission.
The paper provides numerical examples of responses to country-speci￿c shocks to aggregate
productivity, entry costs and monetary policy under plausible interest rate settings with both
￿ oating and ￿xed exchange rates and compare them to their ￿ exible price counterpart.
Keywords: product variety, ￿rm entry, international business cycle, monetary policy, interest
rate rules, exchange rate regimes.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of producer entry for global monetary policy and the propagation of the
international business cycle in a two-country general equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopoly dis-
tortions and imperfect price adjustment. The paper belongs to a recent line of research stressing the
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1implications of producer entry and product creation for the business cycle propagation and policy.1
From a theoretical perspective, these models signi￿cantly improve upon their ￿xed-variety prede-
cessors where monopolistic competition has the unappealing consequence of implying permanent
positive pro￿ts. The introduction of more realistic assumptions on ￿rms entry, in turn, ameliorates
the capacity of arti￿cial economies to reproduce many empirical patterns of macroeconomic aggre-
gates over the cycle. Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007) show that the second moments generated by
their model with endogenous entry and nominal rigidity come very close to the second moments in
the data, outperforming the typical ￿xed-entry real business cycle model as well as their own model
with endogenous entry and ￿ exible prices (Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2005)). Furthermore, these
models can explain a number of empirical regularities that are at odds with the assumption of ￿xed
variety, as the pro-cyclicality of entry and pro￿ts and the counter-cyclicality of markups. A growing
number of contributions is therefore devoted to studying the consequences of endogenous product
variety for monetary policy. A general ￿nding is that sticky prices can distort entry behavior in a
number of ways, thereby creating a new motive for cyclical stabilization and a new role for monetary
policy in welfare maximization. It is argued that well-designed monetary rules can help replicate the
business cycle patterns that would prevail with ￿ exible prices. To this end, producer price stability
typically emerges as a desirable policy prescription.2
Most contributions in the ￿eld refer to closed economies and focus on internal dimensions of
monetary policy. Russ (2007) and Cavallari (2007, 2009) provide notable exceptions by developing
open-economy models with endogenous entry and sticky prices. Russ analyzes the implications of
exchange rate variability for foreign direct investments. She ￿nds that monetary volatility may have
a positive or a negative impact on foreign investments depending on whether it originates at home
ar abroad. In my own previous work, I focus on the choice between trade and foreign investments.
Cavallari (2007) shows that investments in domestic markets and abroad can be sub-optimally low
whenever local monetary stabilization is incomplete. Cavallari (2009) ￿nds that various dimensions
of monetary uncertainty can a⁄ect the decision whether to serve foreign markets in the ￿rst place
and the choice whether to invest at home or abroad. In all these contributions, monetary policy
is exogenous and ￿rms set prices at the beginning of each period. As a consequence, the only way
monetary policy can a⁄ect price and entry dynamics is through the exchange rate. The model in
this paper removes both those limiting assumptions.
1A non-exhaustive list of contributions in this area includes Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007), Bergin and Corsetti
(2005), Lewis (2006), Elkouri and Mancini Gri⁄oli (2006) and Barentsen and Waller (2007). Studies with endogenous
entry in a ￿ exible price setup include, among others, Ghironi and MØlitz (2005), Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2007),
Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2005).
2In many models with endogenous varieties, producer in￿ ation acts as a tax on ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
2This paper introduces endogenous producer entry into the model of Benigno and Benigno (2008)
so as to provide a ￿rst step towards the joint determination of exchange rates and product varieties
under interest rate rules. The monetary regime is represented in the standard form of a feedback
rule as in the Neo-Wicksellian framework (Woodford (2003)). The global nature of the monetary
regime is captured by the interaction of interest rate rules followed by the monetary authorities in
both countries. I consider two ￿ oating regimes, one with symmetric Taylor rules and the other with
interest smoothing, and a regime where the exchange rate is ￿xed at all dates and compare the
macroeconomic dynamics that would prevail with ￿ exible prices (i.e., with the Wicksellian policy)
with the one that arises under the alternative monetary rules. Nominal rigidity is incorporated
through Calvo pricing.
The introduction of endogenous product variety has a number of interesting consequences for
the international monetary transmission. First, it a⁄ects the dynamics of the exchange rate. In
the Wicksellian scenario, the nominal exchange rate follows the path of the terms of trade and the
domestic currency appreciates whenever home productivity rises or the number of home varieties
declines. Since the source of perturbation in the exchange rate is given by real shocks, either
productivity or entry shocks, drawn from stationary distributions, the Wicksellian exchange rate
is stationary. Under ￿ oating regimes with nominal rigidity, on the contrary the exchange rate is
in general non-stationary. Only monetary rules that target the exchange rate manage to stabilize
its long-run value. Moreover, the nominal exchange rate also reacts to nominal shocks whenever
price adjustment is incomplete. Numerical examples show that even a purely transitory drop in the
interest rate is able to generate a persistent depreciation of the domestic currency.
Second, endogenous entry allows to contemplate a novel channel of monetary transmission which
is absent in ￿xed-variety models. As already stressed in closed-economy frameworks, monetary
policy can in￿ uence entry behavior by changing the perception on the part of potential investors
of either the real cost of entry or the expected revenue from their investments (in equilibrium, a
free-entry condition must be satis￿ed requiring that entry costs are equalized to the value of the
￿rm). Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007) stress that monetary authorities, by setting interest rates,
can a⁄ect the real return on ￿nancial assets and the price of equity. In their model, a drop in the
nominal interest rate hikes the real cost of equity and therefore deters start-up investments. Others
argue that a monetary easing will create a more favorable environment for potential investors by
increasing the present value of expected pro￿ts, as in Bergin and Corsetti (2005) and Lewis (2006),
or by directly reducing the entry fees, as in Elkouri and Mancini Gri⁄oli (2006). In my open-
economy setup, an expansion in the global monetary stance has the potential to attract or deter
new investments depending on which one between two opposing e⁄ects prevails. On the one side,
3the drop in the world interest rate makes it more convenient consuming today, thereby reducing
the resources currently available for investments (there is a trade-o⁄ between consumption and
investment). On the other side, however, the favorable demand conditions in global markets tend to
attract potential investors. Numerical examples show that the ￿rst e⁄ect will prevail whenever the
monetary expansion originates at home. The result is due to the incentive on the part of domestic
producers to raise the relative price of their own variety when the domestic currency depreciates.
The opposite might occur with an appreciation of the domestic currency as in the aftermath of a
monetary expansion abroad.
Finally, I stress the implications of endogenous variety for the Phillips curve. In my model,
producer in￿ ation is linked to its expected value and to an index of current marginal costs as
in a typical new-Keynesian Phillips curve. The number of producers featured in current market
conditions is a state variable which contributes to generate endogenous in￿ ation persistence as in
the data. A further di⁄erence with the traditional ￿xed-variety Phillips curve regards the in￿ ationary
consequences of an increase in world demand. As long as the demand boost can be accommodated
only along the intensive margin, i.e. raising output per ￿rm, marginal costs and therefore in￿ ation
will inevitably rise. This is no longer the case when investments can grow along the extensive margin
as well. I show that a rise in the number of producers leads to a fall in in￿ ation as a consequence
of tighter competition in goods markets. These observations have implications for empirical studies
of the Phillips curve. Estimating the curve without accounting for variable varieties along the cycle
raises a potential problem of identi￿cation. The observation of a fall in in￿ ation for a given level of
output would in fact be identi￿ed as a (positive) cost push shock while it is virtually indistinguishable
from an endogenous adjustment in variety.
Numerical simulations show that the responses to aggregate productivity and entry shocks are
very similar to those in the ￿ exible price benchmark for plausible speci￿cations of interest rate
setting. I stress that Taylor rules with only a limited degree of aggressiveness towards producer
in￿ ation manage to induce a pro-cyclical entry behavior consistently with stylized facts. The cyclical
properties of endogenous variables with sticky prices are in general close to their ￿ exible price
counterpart and close to those in the standard real business cycle model. Major di⁄erences concern
the responses of markups and the magnitude of the entry e⁄ect. In order to see the point, consider
productivity shocks as the main source of ￿ uctuations. The responses of potential entrants with
sticky prices are subdued relative to those under ￿ exible prices (between two and three times smaller
depending on the monetary rule in place). This is a consequence of nominal rigidity translating into
persistent real rigidity in my setup with endogenous entry. Incomplete price adjustment, in fact,
implies a real price distortion in favour of those ￿rms that can actually change the price of their
4product. The possibility of incurring in price distortions, in turn, deters investments and leads to
a gradual fall (or to a subdued increase) in the number of producers over time. I stress that the
introduction of nominal rigidity acts as sand in the wheels of the entry mechanism and helps alleviate
the problem of excess volatility in investments typical of real business cycle models without costs
of capital adjustment. Moreover, the real price distortion translates into variable margin of pro￿ts
over the cycle. Remarkably, the responses of markups are counter-cyclical as in the data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium condi-
tions. Section 3 provides the log-linear model and section 4 presents numerical examples. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
The world economy comprises two countries labelled Home, H, and Foreign, F, each specialized in
the production of one type of good as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002). Each country is populated by a
continuum of agents of unit mass. A typical agent in the economy is both a consumer and a worker:
he supplies labor services in a competitive labor market and consumes all the goods produced in the
world economy. In the Home country, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms,
each producing a di⁄erent variety of the Home good h 2 (0;NH), where NH is the number of Home
￿rms. Similarly, in the foreign country there is a continuum of ￿rms f 2 (0;NF). The stock of
producers in the Home and Foreign countries is determined endogenously in the model.
2.1 Consumers￿preferences
A typical agent i in country J = H;F derives utility from consuming a composite index of all the
goods produced in the world economy, C, and from holding real money balances, M
P , while derives
disutility from labour e⁄ort, L. 3 Agents maximize the expected discounted value of ￿ ow utility U



























where ￿ > 0 is the inter-temporal elasticity, ￿ > 0 the elasticity of real money balances and ’ > 0
is the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
The consumption basket C comprises home, CH; and foreign goods, CF; :
3Unless otherwise stated, nominal variables are expressed in domestic currency. So MF, for instance, denotes the
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I assume that prices are set in the producers￿currency and that the law of one price holds P H(h) =
"P F(h) and P H(f) = "P F(f), where " is the nominal exchange rate de￿ned as the price of currency
F in terms of currency H. Notice that overlooking segmentation in international goods markets does
not imply a loss of generality in my setup where all goods are traded. The currency of denomination
of international trade might play a role in the decision whether to serve foreign customers in the ￿rst
place and eventually whether to serve them with exports or by engaging in investments overseas.
The analysis of endogenous changes in trade openness or in the mode of accessing foreign markets
is beyond the scope of the present paper. 4
Finally, I de￿ne the terms of trade of country F , T, as the price of the bundle of goods produced
in country F relative to the price of the bundle of goods produced in country H. Therefore, T =
P H
F =P H
H = P F
F =P F
H:
4Cavallari (2009) provides a model with endogenous trade openness and endogenous entry of export and multina-
tional ￿rms. The currency of denomination of international trade is found to a⁄ect both dimensions of the decision
to serve foreign markets.
62.2 Firms
Producers in the world economy face an identical linear technology where labor is the sole factor.
Output supplied by a ￿rm h in country H and a ￿rm f in country F is given by, respectively:
y
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where ZJ is aggregate labor productivity in country J = H;F. Productivity is exogenous and
follows an AR(1) process in percent deviations from the steady state.
Prior to entry, ￿rms face a sunk entry cost fEJ de￿ned in units of consumption: entry requires
purchasing a basket of materials of amount fEJwhich has the same composition as the consumption
basket, C. Others, as Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007), Bergin and Corsetti (2005) and Cavallari
(2007) among others, de￿ne entry costs in e⁄ective labor units. Entry in this case requires hiring
a certain amount of workers. Notice that the sunk nature of the cost implies that prior to entry
￿rms need to devolve a certain amount of resources to start-up activities independently on whether
these resources are expressed in consumption or in labor units.5 The normalization clearly has
implications for the de￿nition of aggregate variables. With entry costs in units of consumption, for
instance, output of the consumption sector coincides with GDP while this is no longer the case when
entry costs are in labor units.
The entry cost is exogenous and follows an AR(1) process in percent deviations from the steady
state. All ￿rms entered in a given period are able to produce in all subsequent periods until they are
hit by a death shock, which occurs with a constant probability ￿ 2 (0;1): Therefore, a ￿rm entered
in period t will only start producing at time t + 1, introducing a one-period time-to-build lag into
the model.
In each period, there is a ￿nite mass of potential entrants, NEJ: Entrants are forward looking
and decide to start a new production line whenever the real value of the new ￿rm, ￿, covers entry





















where the expression in square brackets is the present discounted value of future real pro￿ts, d.
Finally, the timing of entry implies the following law of motion for the number of producing
￿rms:
5One can think of sunk entry costs as administrative fees, licences or any other burocratic accomplishment which
is required before entering the market or as the cost for advertising the launch of new products.
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I assume that ￿nancial markets are complete within and across countries by allowing agents to trade
in a set of nominal state-contingent bonds denominated in the currency of country J = H;F, BJ;that
span all the states of nature.6 In addition to state-contingent bonds, a typical agent holds domestic





























































where W is the nominal wage and TR is a nominal transfer from the government.
Agents choose consumption, labor e⁄ort, money, share and bond holdings in period t so as to
maximize utility (1) over their whole life horizon subject to the budget constraint (8). Consumers￿











































































1 ￿ (1 + iJ
t )
￿1 (14)
6There exists a complete set of bonds which pay one unit of the domestic currency if state ￿t+1 occurs at time

















Notice that the Euler equation for bonds (9) plus the no arbitrage condition qH
t (st+1) = "tqF
t (st+1),




























Finally, I stress that the assumption of complete markets together with the law of one price and the
fact that consumption bundles are identical across countries imply that consumption risks are fully
insured worldwide, i.e. CH ￿
R 1
0 CH


























I introduce nominal rigidities through a Calvo-type contract. In each period a ￿rm can set a new
price with a ￿xed probability 1 ￿ ￿ which is the same for all ￿rms and is independent on the time
elapsed since the last price change. In every period there will therefore be a share ￿ of ￿rms whose
prices are pre-determined.
A ￿rm sets the price for its own variety so as to maximize the expected discounted value of pro￿ts,
taking into account market demand and the probability that she might not be able to change the
























+ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)EtP
F
t+1(f)
The optimal price depends on current nominal marginal costs as well as on the expectation of future
price changes. Clearly, when ￿ = 0 the optimal price implies a constant markup ￿
￿￿1 on nominal
marginal costs.
Calvo price-setting implies the following state equations for P H

















































Observe that producer prices depend on the stock of current and past producers in this setup with
endogenous entry.
2.5 Aggregate accounting

























t di = 0 (20)






























Aggregating the budget constraint (8) across agents, using the government (20) and resource
constraint (21) and imposing the equilibrium conditions sJ
t+1 = sJ
t = 1 and BJ
t+1 = BJ
t = 0 for any t




















where Y J is GDP in country J = H;F: consumption plus investments in new ￿rms must be equal
to income (wages plus pro￿ts).
The equilibrium conditions of the model are summarized in Table 1.




Number of ￿rms NJ














Euler equation (shares) C
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2.6 Interest rate rules
The model is closed by specifying the monetary policy rules in place in the world economy. I assume
that the monetary instrument is the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate, iJ
t , and consider the






where f is a generic function and ￿ is the information set at time t.
2.7 Equilibrium
The model is not solvable in closed form. In the remaining I will focus on equilibria where the state
variables follows paths that are close to a symmetric deterministic stationary equilibrium in which
producer price in￿ ation and exchange rate depreciation are zero. In this steady state the stochastic
shocks are muted at all dates, ZJ = fEJ = 1. The steady state of the model is summarized in Table
2.
11Table 2: symmetric steady state
Interest rate i =
1￿￿
￿
Terms of trade T = 1
Nominal exchange rate " = 1






Number of ￿rms N = 1￿￿
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Notice that an increase in the stock of production lines, N, leads to a more than proportional
increase in consumption. This is a consequence of love for variety, namely the fact that agents
derive more utility from spanning a given change in consumption over a larger bundle of goods than
consuming a larger amount of each variety. I further stress the existence of a trade-o⁄ between
investments and consumption. As steady state consumption rises, in fact, aggregate accounting
implies that fewer resources will be available for investments. Consequently, NE must fall.
3 The log-linear model
3.1 Demand block
The aggregate demand block is derived from the log-linear approximation to the ￿rst order conditions
of the consumers in the Home and Foreign countries. Consumers allocate their wealth among
consumption, nominal risk-free securities and shares. The ￿rst-order conditions of inter-temporal
optimization require that the marginal rate of substitution between current and one-period ahead
consumption must equalize the real return on nominal assets, both the risk-free bonds and shares.
A ￿rst set of Euler equations, one for each country, will therefore describe the dynamic link between
current and expected one-period ahead consumption and relate it to the risk-free return in units
of consumption. A second set of Euler equations, again one for each country, will instead relate
the inter-temporal pro￿le of consumption to the real return on shares. The real value of the ￿rm,
which coincides with the exogenous entry shock in this model, is the forward solution of the Euler
equations for shares.
The assumption of complete asset markets, together with the law of one price and the fact that
12the consumption index is identical across countries, implies that consumption risks are perfectly
insured in the world economy. I can therefore combine the bond Euler equations in the Home and
Foreign countries, yielding:





















where a hat over a variable denotes the log-deviation from the steady state and Et￿J
t+1 is the expected
one-period ahead producer in￿ ation in country J = H;F . An increase in the world real interest
rate, wherever it is originated, raises the return on bonds, therefore making it more attractive to
postpone consumption in the future.
By taking the di⁄erence between the bond Euler equations across countries, I get a log-linear
approximation to the uncovered interest parity, which links the expected depreciation rate of the
domestic currency to the interest rate di⁄erential:





Finally, I take a log-linear approximation to the de￿nition of the terms of trade, obtaining:





Notice that movements in the terms of trade around the steady state depend on exchange rate
￿ uctuations as well as on producer in￿ ation in the two countries.
3.2 Supply block
The aggregate supply block is derived from the log-linear approximation to the optimal pricing and























t is an index of real marginal costs in country J = H;F at time t. Marginal costs are
positively correlated with a rise in world consumption and a fall in the relative price of domestic
products, while they are negatively associated with productivity shocks and the growth in the number
13of producers.7 The former two variables capture the in￿ ationary e⁄ect of an increase in aggregate
demand accommodated along the intensive margin, i.e. with higher output per ￿rm. When output
increases along the extensive margin, on the contrary, in￿ ationary pressure reduces as a consequence
of tighter competition among producers. I stress that in my setup with endogenous entry, the new-
Keynesian Phillips curves (27) feature a state variable, the number of producers, which introduces
an endogenous persistence into the pattern of in￿ ation as in the data. Furthermore, the presence of
endogenous variety has relevant implications for empirical studies of the Phillips curve. Estimating
the curve without accounting for variable varieties along the cycle raises a potential problem of
identi￿cation. The observation of a fall in in￿ ation for a given level of output would in fact be
identi￿ed as a (positive) cost push shock while it is virtually indistinguishable from an endogenous
adjustment in variety.








PF y(f)df , where the relative price
PJ(j)
PJ is included so as to con-
vert output in terms of the consumption good. Note that with Calvo pricing, ￿rms will produce di⁄er-
ent amounts of output at any given time depending on whether they will be able to change the price of
their own products. A log-linear approximation to these de￿nitions, after some manipulations, yields:
b Y
H
t = (1 + ’)(￿ ￿ 1) b Tt + (1 + ’)Z
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The ￿rst three terms in the expressions above capture the internal margin of output ￿ uctuations.
Focusing on Home output, both an improvement in the home terms of trade, an increase in home
productivity and a fall in consumption lead to a higher real aggregate wage in equilibrium and
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b NF
t￿1
14in turn implies that ￿rms￿size will be larger. The last three terms capture the e⁄ects of price
distortions due to Calvo pricing. The fact that the relative price P H(h)=P H will vary across ￿rms
has two implications for output. First, it a⁄ects the value of output in terms of consumption. In
an in￿ ationary environment it is easier to raise the relative price of a single variety (for those ￿rms
that can actually do it), thereby increasing the value of output. This explains the positive relation
between changes in output and in￿ ation. Second, relative price distortions a⁄ect the external margin
of output ￿ uctuations in a way that will be evident soon. At this stage, I only stress that accounting
for endogenous movements in the stock of producers introduces persistence into the dynamics of
output.


















Finally, the law of motion of ￿rms is:
b N
J
t = (1 ￿ ￿) b N
J
t￿1 + ￿ b N
EJ
t (30)
3.3 Interest rate rules
I consider one regime with ￿xed exchange rates and two ￿ oating regimes.
The ￿rst regime is a unilateral peg to the Foreign currency and features a ￿xed exchange rate at
all dates. There is a potential problem of exchange rate indeterminacy. In order to see why, consider
that exchange rate expectations are zero whenever the Home and Foreign nominal interest rates are
equalized, as it appears from uncovered interest parity (25). The rule b iH
t =b iF
t , however, leaves the
level of the nominal exchange rate undetermined. As outlined in Benigno and Benigno (2008), there
is a simple way of overcoming the problem: the Home nominal interest rate is set so as to follow
the Foreign interest rate and react to the deviation of the exchange rate from a desired target (here,
normalized to zero), i.e. b iH
t =b iF
t ￿ ￿b "t for any ￿ > 0.
The second regime features a symmetric Taylor rule where the nominal interest rate in each




t . Taylor rules have been extensively analyzed since
the seminal paper by Taylor (1993). They do a surprisingly good job of capturing the policy of a
large number of central banks especially in the last few decades when the objective of price stability
has gained a major role in monetary policy-making. As shown in Benigno and Benigno (2008),
the Taylor principle, requiring that policy-makers react more than proportionally to in￿ ation, i.e.
15￿
J
￿ > 1, insures nominal determinacy in an open-economy setup similar to the one considered in this
paper.
Finally, I consider a smoothing regime where nominal interest rates depend on their past values.
In particular, I focus on smoothing Taylor rules as b iJ




t . The rationale for smoothing
rules draws on the desire to reduce volatility in nominal interest rates which might translate into
real volatility given the long and variable lags in monetary transmission.
3.4 Equilibrium with ￿ exible prices
In any equilibrium with ￿ exible prices, only real shocks a⁄ect real variables. The patterns of real
variables are given in Table 3:
Table 3: ￿ exible price equilibrium
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￿1￿￿ : Only world productivity shocks and changes in
the world stock of producers a⁄ect consumption, while relative shocks and changes in the relative
number of producers a⁄ect the terms of trade.
Monetary policy shocks a⁄ect nominal variables. A given change in world nominal interest rates,
however, might be associated with multiple paths for the nominal exchange rate and producer price
in￿ ation (recall the terms of trade equation (26) showing that any given change in T is consistent
with multiple combinations of ￿" and ￿J). In what follows, I will draw the attention on equilibria
where producer price in￿ ation is zero. In a setup with ￿xed entry, the ￿ exible price equilibrium
with zero in￿ ation corresponds to the policy that would be chosen by a central planner interested in
maximizing the utility of all agents in the world economy. 8 As already outlined by Bilbiie, Ghironi
8See, for instance, Benigno and Benigno (2008). In open economies, a terms of trade externality might exist,
implying that an improvement in the terms of trade of, say, H consumers might increase their level of consumption for
16and MØlitz (2007), the same holds in a setup with endogenous entry where producer price in￿ ation
distorts ￿rm entry decisions and therefore the allocation of resources between the creation of new
varieties and the production of existing goods.
Under the assumption of zero producer price in￿ ation, the nominal exchange rate directly follows
the paths of the terms of trade. Given the initial conditions e T￿1 = e "￿1 = 0, equation (26), in fact,
implies that e Tt = e "t at all dates. Combining uncovered interest parity (25) and the Euler equations
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As well-known, the optimal policy can be easily implemented recurring to a credible threat to deviate
from the zero in￿ ation target, i.e. policy-makers follow the rule iJ
t =e iJ
t + #￿J
t for any # > 0.
4 Results
In this section I explore the properties of the model presented above by means of numerical examples.
I compute impulse responses to entry, productivity and monetary policy shocks that originate in the
Home and Foreign countries.
4.1 Calibration
I calibrate a US-EMU model in which country H is the US and country F the EMU. As both
countries contribute to world production in approximately the same way, I consider their size to be
equal and set ￿ = 0:5: In the baseline calibration, periods are interpreted as quarters and ￿ = 0:99
as usual in quarterly models of the business cycle. Following Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007) I
set the size of the exogenous exit shock to 0.025. The rate of ￿rm disappearance is consistent with
a 10 percent rate of job destruction per year as found in the US. Moreover, such a moderate rate
does not overstate the capacity of the model to generate persistence. The elasticity ￿ is set at 7.88
as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), resulting in a reasonable average markup of approximately
18 percent. Trade studies based on micro data usually ￿nd a much lower ￿. The qualitative features
of the impulse responses below do not change if I set ￿ = 3:88.9 The inter-temporal elasticity ￿
a given level of labor e⁄ort. The externality clearly disappears from the point of view of a central planner interested
in the utility of all agents in the world economy.
9Responses with ￿ = 3:88 are available upon request.
17and the Frisch elasticity ’ also follow the parametrization in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
are set to, respectively, 0.16 and 2.13. I consider di⁄erent values for these elasticities and set the
weight of labour e⁄ort in the utility function so that the steady state level of labour supply is unity
irrespective of ’ (this requires ￿ = 0:9224271).
The degree of nominal rigidity is taken from Gal￿, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) who ￿nd a
value for ￿ in the US between 0.407 and 0.66 while the corresponding value for the EMU is between
0.67 and 0.771. As in Benigno and Benigno (2008), I take the middle points from these intervals and
set ￿ = 0:49 in the US and ￿ = 0:72 in the EMU, implying an average duration of nominal contracts
of, respectively 2.3 and 3.65 quarters. I also experiment with a common value for the degree of
nominal rigidity in the two countries equal to 0.66 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), obtaining
qualitatively identical responses. Initial conditions for productivity and entry shocks as well as for
the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate do not a⁄ect the dynamics of the model and can
be set at unity without loss of generality.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Entry costs
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in domestic entry costs. The shock
has a persistence of 0.9 as in Elkouri and Mancini-Gri⁄oli (2006). The ￿gure compares the e¢ cient
￿ exible-price equilibrium obtained under the hypothesis that both countries follow a Wicksellian
policy (blue line), with three alternative regimes. The ￿rst regime is a symmetric Taylor rule where
nominal interest rates respond to domestic in￿ ation, iH
t = 1:5￿H
t in the US and iF
t = 1:5￿F
t in the
EMU (green line); the second is a rule involving interest rate smoothing, which features the same










t ￿0:2"t (red line).
In ￿gure the horizontal axis displays the periods after the shock, while responses denote deviations
from steady state (a value of, say, 0.01 indicates a 1 percent deviation).
Consider the responses when the optimal policy is in place. The hike in entry costs, by increas-
ing the real price of investments, temporarily discourages entry, therefore lowering the number of
entrants, NE. As typical in RBC models without adjustment costs in capital accumulation, the
response of investments concentrates in the earlier periods of the transition, with the number of
entrants returning to steady state sooner than other variables, in approximately 20 quarters. Over
time, the drop in investments translates into a gradual fall in the number of producers that reaches
its peak after 15 periods and then slowly returns to the steady state. It is worth noticing that

































-4 Terms of trade





-4 Nominal exchange rate






-5 Nominal interest rate














Figure 1: Responses to 1 percent rise in home entry costs with Wicksellian policy (blue line), Taylor
rule (green line), smoothing rule (black line) and ￿xed exchange rates (red line).
on impact adjustment takes place exclusively along the intensive margin, with an increase in out-
put per ￿rm (not shown in Figure 1). As less varieties are produced in the home economy, world
consumption reduces. Despite the fall in consumption and the smaller number of entrants, GDP
increases on impact and stays above steady state throughout the transition driven by the increase
in the real value of investments.10 Notably, in my setup with endogenous entry the responses of
key macroeconomic aggregates display the typical hump-shape pattern as in the data. Moreover,
entry contributes to induce responses that persist well beyond the duration of the shock (around 40
quarters).
Finally, I stress that the Wicksellian interest rate does not respond to a rise in domestic entry
costs. This is a consequence of the fact that relative prices in the world economy will automatically
and completely adjust through the variety e⁄ect: the fall in the number of domestic producers leads
to a gradual increase in the relative price of each home variety, thereby improving the home terms
of trade and appreciating the domestic currency, T and " are below their natural levels throughout
the transition. As it will be apparent soon, movements in the terms of trade will transmit the entry
shock worldwide.
When comparing responses across policy rules, the results show that the dynamics of macroeco-
nomic aggregates under the three rules considered is strikingly similar to the one in the ￿ exible-price
10With an inter-temporal elasticity equal to 1.16, the fall in aggregate demand prevails on the value e⁄ect and GDP
falls on impact.
19benchmark. The responses of consumption, the terms of trade and the number of entrants are very
close indeed. Those of GDP, nominal exchange rates, nominal interest rates, in￿ ation and markups
are qualitatively di⁄erent, although their size is very small. The results are consistent with the ￿nd-
ings of Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007) who stress the remarkable similarity of macroeconomic
dynamics under optimal and simple monetary rules in a closed-economy setup with endogenous
entry.
In order to see why, focus on the path of in￿ ation. In the ￿ exible price scenario, relative prices
adjust completely through the variety e⁄ect with no need to generate producer in￿ ation. With
Calvo pricing, on the contrary, producers anticipate the possibility that they might not be able to
change the price of their products in the future and set prices at a premium over marginal costs.
The premium (discount) re￿ ects in￿ ationary (de￿ ationary) expectations. I stress that the three
monetary rules considered manage to bring in￿ ation expectations quite close to zero (the responses
of in￿ ation under the simple rules are below 0.002 per cent). In the early periods after the entry
shock, the drop in aggregate demand is associated with decreasing domestic prices, resulting in a
very moderate de￿ ation in the home economy. Over time, as demand recovers and producers exit
domestic markets, prices gradually begin to grow, drawing in￿ ation above the steady state for a
while. The patterns of in￿ ation are very similar across the three rules considered. The same holds
for the other macroeconomic variables, with the obvious exception of the nominal exchange rate.
The domestic currency permanently depreciates under the Taylor and the smoothing rules.
A major di⁄erence with the ￿ exible price benchmark concerns the responses of markups. With
nominal rigidity, markups vary along the business cycle, staying above the steady state throughout
most of the transition and they do so irrespectively of the monetary rule in place. The ￿nding is
a consequence of the price distortions that materialize with Calvo pricing. The possibility that a
producer might not be able to adjust the price of its own variety in the future contributes to deter
potential entrants, raising the real value of investments above entry costs. Massive exits, in turn,
weaken competition among producers and re￿ ect into higher margins of pro￿t.
The responses in Figure 1 further show that deviations of in￿ ation from target are negatively
associated with the output gap, consistently with the view stressing the existence of a trade-o⁄
between in￿ ation and output. Interestingly, the relation between these two variables depends on the
exchange rate regime. With ￿xed exchange rates, the output gap is negative and high in the early
stage of the transition, then it progressively reduces and eventually becomes positive towards the
end of the transition. With ￿ oating regimes, instead, the output gap is negative during most of
the transition, except for a positive spike on impact. Clearly, the inability to change the exchange
rate makes it harder for monetary authorities to reproduce the macroeconomic dynamics that would
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Figure 2: Responses to a 1 percent rise in foreign entry costs with Wicksellian policy (blue line),
Taylor rule (green line), smoothing rule (black line) and ￿xed exchange rates (red line).
prevail with ￿ exible prices, especially in the early stage of the transition. As adjustment proceeds,
on the contrary, the distance with the natural exchange rate reduces and eventually disappears.
Consequently, the pattern of the terms of trade under ￿xed exchange rates lags behind the one with
￿ oating regimes for most of the time.
In order to evaluate international spillovers, consider the responses of home aggregates to a rise
in foreign entry costs as shown in Figure 2. The shock has a persistence of 0.9 as before.
The rise in the real price of foreign investments clearly discourages foreign entrants (not shown in
Figure 2) for motives similar to those already discussed. The fall in the number of foreign producers,
in turn, has two opposing e⁄ects on home aggregate demand. On the one side, it will depress world
consumption via the rise in world interest rates (due to arbitrage between shares and bonds) and
the variety e⁄ect (as long as less varieties of the Foreign good are available at a higher relative price,
world consumption will reduce). As foreign producers gradually exit the market, on the other side,
the relative price of each foreign variety increases, thereby appreciating the foreign terms of trade
and shifting demand towards home goods. In the baseline calibration, the ￿rst e⁄ect prevails and
both investments and output reduce at home.11 As before, the fall in the number of producers is
associated with positive markups throughout the transition.
11With a high inter-temporal elasticity, however, output and investment spillovers turn positive on impact (not
shown in ￿gure).
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Figure 3: Responses to 1 percent a rise in home productivity with Wicksellian policy (blue line),
Taylor rule (green line), smoothing rule (black line) and ￿xed exchange rates (red line).
4.2.2 Productivity
Figure 3 shows the responses to a 1 percent rise in home productivity. The productivity shock has
a persistence of 0.9 as in Bergin and Corsetti (2005).
Focus again on the scenario with optimal policy. The increase in productivity lowers marginal
costs and real interest rates and has expansionary consequences for consumption and GDP. The
favorable business environment, in turn, attracts more ￿rms into the home market and the number
of entrants increases. Note that the response of investments is very large (around 30 percent) as
typical in RBC models without costs of capital adjustment.12 In my model, in fact, the real price of
investment is constant absent exogenous changes in fE and it reduces to one unit of consumption
absent such shocks, ￿ = 1, exactly as in the standard RBC model. Importantly, however, this does
not imply that the price of equity in units of the ￿rm￿ s own output, ￿ PH
PH(h), or nominal share prices
are constant. Moreover, entry concentrates in the early stage of the transition with the number of
entrants returning to the natural level in less than two years, while it translates into a gradual increase
in the number of producers over time. As more producers compete in home markets, the price of
home varieties gradually falls together with marginal costs at unchanged markups. The Wicksellian
policy is counter-cyclical and the Home interest rate stays above the steady state throughout the
transition. The hike in the interest rate is responsible for the appreciation of the Home currency and
12In a closed economy context, Bilbiie-Ghironi and MØlitz (2007)) obtain a response of entrants to a productivity
shock as high as 80 percent.
22the Home terms of trade on impact. Over time, as the price of Home products gradually decreases
and the interest rate returns to the steady state, the Home currency and the Home terms of trade
depreciate before returning to the natural level.
Comparing the macroeconomic dynamics under nominal rigidity with the ￿ exible price bench-
mark reveals a number of interesting features. The responses of output, the number of entrants and
the stock of producers, although similar qualitatively, vary signi￿cantly in magnitude. This is a con-
sequence of investments being twice as large in the Wicksellian scenario than under the alternative
monetary rules. In this respect, the introduction of nominal rigidity appears to mitigate the excess
volatility of investments that is typical of RBC models without costs of capital adjustment. The
reason is easy to grasp: nominal rigidity translates into real rigidity through the real price of invest-
ment, which is the key driver of entry in the model. In order to see why, consider the dynamics of
producer price in￿ ation and markups. Under the optimal rule, the increase in productivity reduces
marginal costs and the relative price of each product in the economy in exactly the same proportion,
leaving markups unaltered at the ￿rm level and in the aggregate as well. This implies that relative
prices adjust completely, i.e. they move one to one with the productivity shock, and so does the real
value of investments. Clearly, producer in￿ ation is zero. With Calvo pricing, instead, relative prices
within a given period will di⁄er across ￿rms depending on whether they can or cannot adjust the
price of their own product, thereby introducing a real price distortion .The price distortion, in turn,
deters potential investments, implying less than optimal responses in the number of entrants and
the stock of production lines. Moreover, the disconnect between relative prices and marginal costs
translates into variable margins of pro￿ts throughout the transition. Remarkably, the responses of
markups in Figure 3 reproduce the typical counter-cyclical pattern that appears in the data.
Price distortions show up in the pattern of in￿ ation. On impact, home producer prices fall driven
by the decline in marginal costs. Over time, as the number of producers returns to the steady state,
de￿ ation gradually tends to zero. Notice that the responses of key macroeconomic variables depend
on the exchange rate regime. With ￿xed exchange rates, the response of domestic producer prices
to the rise in productivity is subdued. The gain in terms of price stability, however, comes at the
cost of higher distortions in relative prices and therefore even a smaller incentive to invest. As entry
dynamics weakens, in turn, markups stay closer to the steady state.
Interestingly, sticky prices appear to change the responses of nominal exchange rates relative to
the ￿ exible price benchmark along two dimensions. First, the sign of the response is completely
reversed both on impact and over time: whenever the nominal exchange rate depreciates under
the Taylor and the smoothing rule, it appreciates under the Wicksellian policy. Second, the Home
currency displays a persistent appreciation with the Taylor and the smoothing rules, consistently with
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Figure 4: Responses to a 1 percent rise in foreign productivity with Wicksellian policy (blue line),
Taylor rule (green line), smoothing rule (black line) and ￿xed exchange rates (red line).
ample evidence showing a signi￿cant degree of persistence in nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations. The
￿nding re￿ ects a di⁄erent orientation of monetary policy. In a world with ￿ exible prices, monetary
policy simply accommodates changes in the natural interest rate, letting the exchange rate ￿ uctuate
consequently. This is possible only at the cost of higher exchange rate variability when prices
are sticky. I stress that excess volatility materializes even with a moderate aggressiveness towards
in￿ ation as in the rules considered. As it will be apparent soon, the type of monetary rule in place
has a major role in transmitting shocks worldwide.
Figure 4 reports the responses of domestic macroeconomic aggregates to a 1 percent rise in foreign
productivity. The persistence of the shock is 0.9 as in the Home country.
The boost in productivity has a positive impact on world consumption in all the regimes consid-
ered, independently on whether it originates at home or abroad. In ￿ oating regimes, the responses of
consumption to foreign productivity are very close indeed to the responses in Figure 3. The motives
are essentially the same: the rise in productivity lowers real interest rates and attracts investments
(abroad, in this case), thereby stimulating world consumption.13 The rise in foreign productivity
propagates its e⁄ects worldwide through the movements in the terms of trade. In the ￿ exible price
scenario, the foreign terms of trade (and the foreign currency) deteriorate during most of the tran-
sition, except for an appreciation on impact, shifting demand towards foreign goods. In the Home
country, in turn, improving terms of trade and higher prices for domestic varieties increase the real
13The response of consumption with ￿xed exchange rates is similar to the one in Figure 3 yet it is much smaller in
the early periods and larger towards the end of the transition.
24price of investments and induce ￿rms to exit Home markets. As already stressed, the response of
investments is very large (-20 percent) and translates into a substantial fall in the number of home
producers. Consequently, Home GDP drops in the early stage of the transition despite the expansion
in world consumption.
Comparing responses across monetary rules reveals a number of interesting features in interna-
tional output and investment spillovers. First, the response of investments under all three rules
considered is much weaker than with ￿ exible prices (less than 1 percent relative to a fall as high as
20 percent with ￿ exible prices). The reason lies in the price distortions due to Calvo pricing which,
as already discussed, act as sand in the wheels of the entry mechanism. Second, the response of
investments to the boost in foreign productivity may even turn positive, as it appears to be the
case with ￿xed exchange rates. The ￿nding is a consequence of the fall in the real price of Home
investments which occurs in the early stage of the transition when Home prices are insulated from
the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of a depreciating Home currency (as a matter of fact, Home producer in-
￿ ation is negative in the ￿rst year of the transition). The combination of declining prices and a
higher number of producers under ￿xed exchange rates, in turn, leads markups below their natural
level throughout the transition. Finally, output spillovers are positive both on impact and along the
transition, driven by the improvement in the home terms of trade (note that the improvement is
larger with ￿ exible exchange rates). I stress that output adjustment takes place mostly along the
intensive margin, with an increase in ￿rms￿size (not shown in Figure 4).
4.2.3 Monetary policy
Figures 5 and 7 show the responses to a one percent purely transitory fall in, respectively, domestic
and foreign interest rates for di⁄erent values of the inter-temporal elasticity. The black line cor-
responds to the case of low elasticity, ￿ = 0:16, and the blue line to ￿ = 1:16: The responses are
calculated under a symmetric smoothing rule.
The responses of consumption in Figures 5 and 7 are identical as one would expect with perfect
risk sharing. The monetary expansion, wherever it is originated, boosts world demand as long as
prices are sticky, leading to a spike in world consumption on impact and throughout the ￿rst year of
the transition. Over time, as relative prices slowly return to their natural levels, world consumption
declines for a while before converging to the steady state. Clearly, the responses of consumption are
much more volatile when the inter-temporal elasticity is small (on impact, they are approximately
ten times larger with a low ￿). Notice that despite the shock is purely transitory, the dynamics of
consumption and other macroeconomic aggregates display a signi￿cant degree of persistence as one
25observes in the data. In my setup with endogenous entry, the ￿nding holds, albeit over a shorter
time horizon, also with monetary rules that do not feature interest rate smoothing (Figures 8 and
9).
The rise in global demand must be accommodated by a corresponding increase in global output.
Comparing the responses in Figures 5 and 7, it appears that the origin of the shock is crucial for
understanding whether adjustment takes place mostly at home or abroad and along the intensive or
the extensive margin. To start with, focus on the home monetary shock. The monetary easing fuels
domestic in￿ ation (Figure 6), thereby contributing to devalue the domestic currency, deteriorate the
home terms of trade and reduce the relative price of domestic varieties, Ph=PH. As a consequence,
the real value of investments stays above the steady state throughout the transition and discourages
potential entrants despite the favorable demand conditions. Investors prefer to accommodate the
rise in demand by increasing the scale of production, i.e. output per ￿rm lies above the steady state
for most of the transition. In so doing, in fact, they can take advantage of the fall in real wages
that is associated with declining terms of trade and maintain markups well above the steady state.
I stress that this holds independently on the value of the inter-temporal elasticity. The fall in the
number of entrants, in turn, is responsible for the drop in domestic output in the early stage of
the transition. Over time, as world demand cools down and exit weakens, output will gradually
return towards the natural level. The ￿nding that investments in new varieties might be negatively
associated with a monetary easing accords with the results in Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007).
In their model, exit is driven by the rise in the real value of investments that materializes with a
monetary easing (a drop in the interest rate directly reduces the real return on bonds and, through
arbitrage, also the return on shares. This in turn requires an increase in share prices and therefore
in entry costs). In my open-economy setup, the real value of investment might either increase or fall
depending on the country of origin of the shock. As it will be apparent soon, a foreign monetary
easing may well lead to an increase in the number of domestic entrants.
Now, consider the responses of domestic variables to a monetary easing abroad (Figure 7).
In the early stage of the transition, the burst in foreign demand is associated with an appreciation
of the home currency and an improvement in the home terms of trade, both T and " fall. World
expenditure therefore switches in favour of foreign goods. Nonetheless, home GDP rises on impact
and remains above the steady state for about a year, precisely 3 quarters with low ￿ and 5 quarters
with high ￿; driven by the hike in world consumption. Over time, as consumption declines output
stays below the natural level for most of the transition.
I stress that changes in GDP might take place mostly along the intensive or the extensive margin
depending on the inter-temporal elasticity. Potential investors in home markets, in fact, face two
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Figure 5: Responses to a transitory fall in the home interest rate with low (black line) and high
elasticity (blue line).
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Figure 6: Responses to a transitory fall in the home interest rate (continued) with low (black line)
and high elasticity (blue line).
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Figure 7: Responses to a transitory fall in the foreign interest rate with low (black line) and high
elasticity (blue line).
opposing forces. On the one side, they are induced to invest more in the very early stage of the
transition so as to pro￿t from the favorable demand conditions that materialize in the aftermath
of the monetary easing. On the other side, however, the attractiveness of the business environment
may deteriorate as a consequence of a temporary hike in marginal costs. In the ￿rst periods after
the shock, in fact, real wages increase (not shown in Figure 7), driven by the improvement in the
home terms of trade. The ￿rst e⁄ect prevails when the inter-temporal elasticity is high, implying a
positive correlation between investments in new varieties and monetary innovations.
Figures 8 and 9 display the responses to transitory interest rate shocks in the Home and the
Foreign country in the benchmark calibration under di⁄erent speci￿cations of the interest rate rule
followed by the monetary autorities in both countries: the black line refers to the Taylor rule with a
producer in￿ ation target, the green line to the Taylor rule with a consumer in￿ ation target and the
blue line to the ￿xed exchange rate regime.
The responses in Figures 8 and 9 are qualitatively identical to those in Figures 5 and 7, except for
the regime with ￿xed exchange rates. The major di⁄erence between the smoothing and the Taylor
rules concerns the higher persistence of macroeconomic aggregates under the former rule.
Focusing on Figure 8, I stress that targeting producer or consumer prices does not a⁄ect the
responses to domestic interest rate shocks in a signi￿cant way. The responses to a drop in the foreign
interest rate (Figure 9), on the contrary, are much more pronounced under the target on producer
in￿ ation. The reason is that stabilizing consumer in￿ ation requires Home monetary authorities to
o⁄set the in￿ ationary pressure from abroad by increasing the home interest rate. This in turn tends
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Figure 8: Responses to a transitory fall in the home interest rate with producer in￿ ation target
(black line), consumer in￿ ation target (green line) and ￿xed exchange rates (blue line)
to stabilize the nominal exchange rate and therefore reduce international spillovers. In Figure 9, the
responses under the target on consumer in￿ ation are very close indeed to those with ￿xed exchange
rates. Not surprisingly, ￿xing the exchange rate completely insulates the economy from monetary
shocks abroad.
5 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the role of producer entry for global monetary policy and the propagation of
the international business cycle in a two-country general equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopoly
distortions and imperfect price adjustment. By introducing endogenous producer entry into the
model of Benigno and Benigno (2008), it has provided a theory for the joint determination of
exchange rates and product varieties under interest rate rules. I have considered two ￿ oating regimes
characterized by Taylor rules with and without interest smoothing and a regime with ￿xed exchange
rates and compared the macroeconomic dynamics under these rules with its ￿ exible price counterpart.
Numerical examples have documented the responses of key endogenous variables to country-speci￿c
shocks to aggregate productivity, entry costs and interest rates.
The paper shows that endogenous product variety a⁄ects di⁄erent dimensions of the international
cyclical transmission. First, ￿rms￿entry introduces an endogenous persistence into the patterns of
macroeconomic aggregates, producer prices, exchange rates and the terms of the trade consistently
with stylized facts. Exchange rates, in particular, are found to be non-stationary under ￿ oating
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Figure 9: Responses to a transitory fall in the foreign interest rate with producer in￿ ation target
(black line), consumer in￿ ation target (green line) and ￿xed exchange rates (blue line)
regimes.
Second, I show that entry reacts to interest rate innovations as long as prices are ￿xed, extending
to open economies the monetary transmission mechanism in Bilbiie, Ghironi and MØlitz (2007)
and Bergin and Corsetti (2005). Di⁄erently from these contributions where interest rate changes
are, respectively, either positively or negatively correlated with entry, I stress that an easing of the
global monetary stance might in principle attract or deter investments along the extensive margin,
i.e. investments in new varieties. In my setup, interest rate setting has two opposing e⁄ects on
entry. On the one side, a drop in the interest rate, by inducing more consumption today, reduces
the resources available for investment and therefore discourages potential entrants. The boost in
demand, on the other side, creates a more favorable business environment thereby attracting new
investors. Numerical simulations show that the ￿rst e⁄ect prevails whenever the domestic currency
depreciates, as when the monetary easing originates at home. With a depreciating currency, in fact,
domestic producers are able to raise the relative price of their own variety yet limiting the loss in
terms of their market shares. The opposite may occur under a foreign monetary expansion.
Finally, numerical examples show that the major di⁄erences in the cyclical properties of en-
dogenous variables with sticky prices and their ￿ exible price counterpart concern the responses of
markups and the magnitude of the entry e⁄ect. I stress that nominal rigidity acts as sand in the
wheels of the entry mechanism by introducing persistent real price distortions across ￿rms. The dis-
connect between relative prices and marginal cost, on the other side, translates into counter-cyclical
margins of pro￿ts over the cycle.
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